Today, Dr. Yao and collaborators from PIC, New Hope Liuhe, and University of Cambridge describe the implementation of a test and removal strategy on an African Swine Fever virus (ASFV) infected farm, highlighting the importance of early detection and rapid responses to contain the virus in a population.
The University of Minnesota College of Veterinary Medicine’s (CVM) Secure Food System (SFS) team collaborate with public and private partners to develop tactical biosecurity strategies to limit disease spread for specific animal movements based on risk-based science. The awarded work pursues these objectives:
Assess the risk of animal movements and their agricultural products during an outbreak and translate the risk-based science into workable movement permit guidance;
Develop tactical strategies to limit foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak spread in integrated agriculture systems; and
Conduct outreach on emergency preparedness and the SFS platform.
We hope our US readers had a great Thanksgiving surrounded by loved ones. We are grateful that all of you keep reading us week after week and we hope we can continue providing you with valuable content for a long time!
This week, Drs. Sunil Mor and Albert Rovira from the University of Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory explain how we can use whole genome sequencing during a PRRS outbreak investigation.
Viral recombination is documented in PRRSv
Whole Genome Sequencing can provide the detailed information to better understand recombination and PRRSv dynamics
Our ninth presentation is from Dr. Kim VanderWaal, our colleague at the University of Minnesota, who gives us a glimpse into a future when producers might be able to know when their farms are at risk of disease outbreaks.
Communication between veterinarians and farm managers can help unravel patterns that might seem unique in one system.
Even though the source of APP was not determined outbreak investigation can help to find common links between sources.
A series of Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (APP) outbreaks involving five farms belonging to three different production companies were reported. Serotype 8 was confirmed as the source of the clinical signs in all the cases. The outbreak started with the two southernmost located farms (Company A Farm 1 and Company B Farm), followed by Company C (Farm 1) four weeks later. The distance among these growing pig sites ranged from 0.6 to 8.3 miles and the region where they are located can be considered as a high hog density area (Picture 1).
Common links between several sites were revealed after conversations among veterinarians and production managers. The main transmission route for this bacterium is introducing APP carrier pigs. In this case, it can be easily ruled out as these are sites that flow independently.
Other possibilities include indirect transmission through fomites and aerosol. Although these production companies do not share employees or tools they do have a common link in that some did share the same rendering company which could have been servicing other sites that were APP positive. As for manure removal, companies do not use the same manure removal company. One company did have the same individual doing the manure removal procedure at one site while breaking and then proceeded to the next one. Airborne transmission has been suggested as another possibility and after preliminary wind direction analyses during the outbreak dates it was inconclusive.